Co-operative federalism in Australia - an intellectual resource for Europe II by French, R.S.
17
Amicus Curiae Issue 66 July/August 2006
THE APPLICATION OF THE REFERRAL
POWER
Since federation there have been a number ofreferences of power pursuant to section 51(xxxvii)although it has come into greater prominence more
recently not least because of the post-Wakim referrals in
relation to corporations law and recent referrals with
respect to threats to national security. A complete list of
references up till 2001 is set out in the Third Edition of
Sawer’s The Australian Constitution – (see Annexure 2 at
the end of the second part of this article). Referral Acts
from the various States have covered, inter alia, meat
inspection, state banking, poultry processing, and air
navigation. In the area of family law, the artificiality of
constitutionally derived distinctions based upon the
reservation to State legislatures of powers in relation to
child custody, guardianship, access and maintenance was
overcome by all States except Western Australia, referring
power over these issues to the Commonwealth so that they
could be dealt with by the Family Court of Australia. (This
was recommended by the Joint Select Committee on the
Family Law Act (1980) and effected by the following State
legislation: Commonwealth Powers (Family Law –
Children) Act 1986 (NSW), (Vic); Commonwealth Powers
(Family Law – Children) Act 1990 (Qld); Commonwealth
Powers (Family Law) Act 1986 (SA) and Commonwealth
Powers (Family Law) Act 1987 (Tas)). That is a federal
court created by the Commonwealth Parliament. Western
Australia being the only State to set up a Family Court
under State law was able to take advantage of the
autochthonous expedient so that its Court has always been
able to exercise both Federal and State jurisdiction.
Jurisdictional issues with respect to property disputes
remain. There has been no referral of power in that respect
(J Crawford Australian Courts of Law 3rd edn (Melbourne:
OUP, 1993) 224-26).
An important application of the referral power is the
mutual recognition scheme. This was an interesting model
of consensus building leading to an important co-operative
referral. In 1991, a process of national consultation was
promoted by a Commonwealth-State Committee on
Regulatory Reform which was set up after the State
Premiers’ Conference in 1990. A discussion paper was
prepared by the Commonwealth-State Committee on
Regulatory Reform called “The Mutual Recognition of
Standards and Regulations in Australia.”
Seminars were held in each capital city. The discussion
paper identified the possibility that Australia might have
more barriers to trade in goods and services between
States and Territories than would exist between the
member nations of the European Community. Freedom in
interstate trade and mobility of labour and capital would
not be achieved if regulatory environments across States
and Territories allowed that possibility to exist. The paper
observed (at p2):
Mutual recognition of standards and regulations by all States
and Territories has the potential to achieve these objectives.
Mutual recognition allows all regulations throughout
Australia to co-exist while reducing the current adverse
impacts of those regulatory differences.
The Premiers and Chief Ministers met in November
1991 and a formal agreement was signed on behalf of the
Commonwealth, the States and the Territories on May 11,
1992. The Mutual Recognition Act 1992 (Cth) was passed
as a law of the Commonwealth following referrals of power
by the parliaments of New South Wales and Queensland.
Each of these referrals was for a fixed period. The matters
referred were defined in the referring Acts in terms of “the
enactment of an Act in the terms or substantially the terms
set out in the Schedule”. In each case the proposed Mutual
Recognition Bill 1992 (Cth) was scheduled to the State
Referring Act. The law passed by the Parliament of the
Commonwealth under that referral was adopted by the
other States and Territories and last, with historical
consistency, by Western Australia. In Western Australia the
adoption was effected by section 4(1) of the Mutual
Co-operative federalism in
Australia – an intellectual
resource for Europe? II
by Justice R S French
This two-part article is taken from a lecture given at the Institute of Advanced Legal
Studies on February 22, 2006.
Recognition (Western Australia) Act 1995 (WA). It was
limited to the original Commonwealth Act and any
amendments made to it before the State Act received royal
assent. The Commonwealth Act is scheduled to the State
Act. The State Act also provided that the adoption was to
cease at a specified date, defined as February 28, 1998 or
such earlier date as might be fixed by proclamation. The
State law has subsequently been extended and the adoption
of the Commonwealth Act continues in force in Western
Australia (See generally, M Bini “Mutual Recognition and
the Reference Power” (1998) 72 ALJ 696; EJ Wright
“Mutual Recognition and the National Market for Goods”
(1993) 78 ABLR 270; Carroll, “Mutual Recognition:
Origins and Implementation” (1995) 54 AJPA 35; T
Thomas & C Saunders (eds) The Australian Mutual
Recognition Scheme: A New Approach to an Old Problem
(Melbourne: Centre for Comparative Constitutional
Studies, 1995).
The most important use of the referral power in recent
history is that which supported the introduction of the
new corporations scheme, post the Wakim decision. It is
not necessary for present purposes to refer to the
convoluted negotiations and game playing that went on
prior to its adoption. Under the new scheme each State
referred the text of the Corporations Bill 2001 and the
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Bill
2001 to the Commonwealth as the referred “matter” to
the extent to which they deal with matters within the
legislative powers of the States. Each State also referred:
The formation of corporations, corporate regulation and the
regulation of financial products and services … to the extent
of the making of laws with respect to those matters by making
express amendments of the corporations legislation.
The latter reference has effect only to the extent that the
matter is not already a subject of Commonwealth power.
There is a five year sunset clause for each reference. The
references may also be terminated earlier by proclamation
of the Governor in Council. In some cases the amendment
reference can be terminated separately.
Following the references, the Commonwealth
Parliament, relying upon section 51(xxxvii) enacted the
Corporations Act 2001 and the Australian Securities and
Investment Commission Act 2001. The Commonwealth
and the States also entered into an agreement which
involved undertakings about the use of the referred
matters, specified procedures for the alteration of the
statutes and for termination of the references and requires
that the operation of the scheme be reviewed every three
years. A powerful impetus to the formation of the scheme
was the referral agreement made by Victoria and New
South Wales directly with the Commonwealth. That
agreement left the other States with little option but to go
along with referral. Queensland did so. Western Australia
joined in following a change of government in that State.
South Australia and Tasmania also joined after the
Commonwealth agreed to consider an amendment to the
reference limiting the degree to which the power could be
used to require persons to incorporate.
More recently, various States have referred power to the
Commonwealth to make laws with respect to terrorism. In
Western Australia referral was effected by the Terrorism
(Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (WA) which, although
assented to on January 14, 2003 has not yet been fully
proclaimed. The Act is in substance a text reference
although there is a subject matter flavour about it which
may raise interesting questions if the application, in
Western Australia, of laws made under the reference ever
arises for judicial consideration. The text of what are called
the “referred provisions” is set out in Schedule 1 to the
Act. It comprises a new Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth
Criminal Code. The operative provision of the referring
Act is section 4. It refers:
(a) the matters to which the referred provisions relate, but
only to the extent of the making of laws with respect to
those matters by including the referred provisions in
the Commonwealth Criminal Code in the terms, or
substantially in the terms, of the text set out in
Schedule 1; and
(b) the matter of terrorist acts, and actions relating to
terrorist acts, but only to the extent of the making of
laws with respect to that matter by making express
amendments of the terrorism legislation or the
criminal responsibility legislation.
The reference is fixed in time and is also subject to
termination by the Governor by proclamation (s 5).
CONSTRUCTIONAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY
THE REFERRAL POWER
As appears from the Convention Debates and from
subsequent case law and discussion of the referral power,
there are a number of unresolved issues about its
operation. Some of these issues may offer the sorts of
constructional choices which may be determined
according to a strict or broad interpretation informed to a
lesser or greater degree by the proposition that the
constitution does contemplate something which can
sensibly be called “co-operative federalism.”
At the outset it may be observed that the power is not,
in express terms, a power to refer matters. It is a power
conferred upon the parliament of the Commonwealth to
make laws with respect to matters referred. This has the
important consequence that the laws so made are federal
laws. The legislative power conferred by section 51(xxxvii)
is subject to the constitution. So constitutional
prohibitions will operate with respect to it. Being federal
laws, laws made pursuant to section 51(xxxvii) attract the
operation of section 109 in respect of inconsistent State
laws. It is noteworthy that the Corporations Law 2001
seeks to overcome the risks of inadvertent inconsistency by18
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expressly denying any intention “to exclude or limit the
concurrent operation of any law of a State.” Under section
5F the States may exclude the operation of the
Corporations Law in relation to a matter in whole or in
part. This is subject to the Commonwealth by regulation
countering that exclusion. There are also rollback
provisions in sections 5G and 5I.
A question has been raised in academic commentary
about whether a law adopted by a State parliament
pursuant to section 51(xxxvii) is also a Commonwealth law
(see JA Thomson “Adopting Commonwealth Laws: Section
51(xxxvii) of the Australian Constitution” (1993) 4 PLR
153). The power conferred by section 51(xxxvii) is
qualified so as to limit the operation of a law made under
it to the referring States and to any States adopting that
law. With respect to the contrary view, it is difficult to see
how the language of the section could contemplate a law
made pursuant to section 51(xxxvii) somehow changing its
character from Federal to State depending upon whether it
applied to a referring or an adopting State.
Section 51(xxxvii) does not expressly confer power
upon the States to refer matters or adopt laws made under
it. Nor does it specify the mechanism by which State
parliaments shall refer matters to the Parliament of the
Commonwealth or adopt laws made under the referral
power. The practice has been to effect such referrals and
adoptions by Acts of the State parliaments. The source of
the power to refer is to be found either in the State
constitutions or, by implication, from the Commonwealth
Constitution. This precise question has not fallen for
determination. However it certainly seems at least
plausible that the power to refer or adopt is a power
conferred upon the Parliaments of the various States, as an
implied power by the Commonwealth Constitution.
Alternatively, it may be that the implication operates upon
the constitution of each State by a reading together of
section 51(xxxvii) and section 106 of the constitution.
What may be referred is a “matter”. In his address
“Making Federalism Work: A New Frame of Reference” at
the Australian Association of Constitutional Law Seminar
in Perth in May 2002 the then Commonwealth Attorney-
General, Darryl Williams, said:
Two types of reference are possible: ‘subject matter’ and ‘text’
references. An example of the former was reference of the
matter of ‘air transport’ by Queensland to the Commonwealth
in 1943 and 1950. The mutual recognition scheme and the
corporations law schemes were both examples of ‘text’
references subject to the amendments reference in the later
scheme.
The scope of the “matters referred” in section
51(xxxvii) was discussed in R v The Public Vehicles Licensing
Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Australian National Airways Pty Ltd
1964) 113 CLR 207. There it was held that the
Commonwealth Powers (Air Transport) Act 1952 (Tas) was a
valid reference by the parliament of the State of Tasmania
to the Parliament of the Commonwealth of a “matter”
under section 51(xxxvii). The High Court said (at
224–25):
One contention which can be disposed of at once is that under
s 51(xxxvii) the power to be referred by a State or States must
be simply a power to enact a law in the form of a statute
which is described and defined just as an act of parliament
would be. This argument is apparently derived from the words
at the end of paragraph (xxxvii) ‘which afterwards adopt the
law’. From that it is inferred that the matter referred to the
Parliament of the Commonwealth by the Parliament of a State
must be the law. This seems to be an entirely erroneous
inference without foundation. The law referred to by the last
word goes back to the initial words of section 51 – ‘the
Parliament shall … have power to make laws for the peace,
order and good government of the Commonwealth’ and refers
to the law made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth in
pursuance of a reference of a matter. It seems absurd to
suppose that the only matter that could be referred was the
conversion of a specific bill for a law into a law.
It may be inferred from that passage that the Court
would have little difficulty in upholding the validity of text
references notwithstanding the use of the word “matter” in
section 51 (xxxvii). If the power were limited to matters
referred in terms of defined subjects of legislation only, the
political and historical realities of the Australian Federation
would result in the reference power being invoked with
about the same frequency as constitutional referenda
succeed. The text reference mechanism provides
safeguards for the States who are not, by their reference,
giving the Commonwealth carte blanche to make laws on
any aspect of the subject matter referred.
There is an important open question as to whether a
reference unlimited in time is irrevocable (see Graham v
Patterson (195) 81 CLR 1, Webb J 25; Airlines of NSW v New
South Wales (1964) 113 CLR 1, 53; R v Public Vehicles
Licensing Appeal Tribunal (1964) 113 CLR 207, 226; Sande v
Registrar, Supreme Court (Qld) (1996) 64 FCR 123, Lockhart
J 131). However there is little controversy that a referral
may be for a fixed period (see Airlines of NSW ibid, Taylor J
38, Kitto J agreeing 30, Windeyer J 53; R Anderson
“Reference of Powers by the States to the Commonwealth”
(1951) 2 UWAL Rev 1, 7–8; RD Lumb & GA Moens The
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia Annotated 5th
edn (Sydney: Butterworths, 1995) 283; cf WA Wynes
Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia 5th edn
(Sydney: Law Book Co, 1976) 171). The uncertainty as to
whether a reference unlimited in time is revocable will no
doubt have the consequence that for the foreseeable future
most, if not all, references will contain a sunset clause.
An interesting question arises about what happens to a
Commonwealth law passed pursuant to the referral power
if referral by the State is terminated, whether according to
a self-executing sunset clause or by revocation. Absent any
other provisions, it would be expected that such a law 19
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would continue in force for there is nothing in the grant of
the power which makes the laws under it self-terminating
upon revocation of the referral. In this respect the position
of referring States and adopting States is arguably different.
The latter case would depend upon whether the reference
in section 51 (xxxvii) to States whose parliaments
“afterwards adopt the law” provides for extension of the
law to those States only during the currency of the
adoption or once and for all after adoption. This would not
be a practical problem where referral or adoption involving
sunset clauses also provide for self terminating provisions
in the laws made pursuant to the referral. Apparently
however this is not the case with the Corporations Law.
There is a related question about the basis upon which a
law made under a referral may be amended. Where the
referral is of a subject matter rather than a precise text
then, so long as the referral subsists, there would seem to
be little doubt that the Commonwealth could amend laws
made pursuant to it provided the amendment did not take
the laws outside the scope of the subject matter. The effect
of amendment upon the law and States which had adopted
the original law rather than referred the subject matter is
questionable.
If the Commonwealth were to repeal a law made under
a referral the law would also cease to have effect in those
States which had adopted it. Amendment of a referred law
would require adoption by non-referring States, either of
the amendment or of the law as amended if it were to
continue to have effect in those States. Absent such
adoption, it is arguable that the original unamended
version of the law would cease to have effect in non-
referring States.
A mechanism by which referring or adopting States may
deter the Commonwealth from non-consensual
amendment would be to make the referral or adoption
subject to a condition that it would be revoked in the event
that the law were amended otherwise than in accordance
with some agreed mechanism for obtaining consensus.
Even then the question remains about the operation of the
original version of the Commonwealth law if the referral or
adoption is revoked.
The language of the referral power leaves open the
possibility that a Commonwealth law made under it may
have application to one or more, but not necessarily all,
States of Australia. This possibility does not seem to have
been prominent in the consideration of the power during
the Convention debates. The spectacle of a kind of Swiss
cheese Commonwealth law is not particularly edifying but
is plainly open and indeed is a reality under certain of the
limited referrals already in place. At one point it was a
possibility that a Commonwealth Corporations Law would
be enacted which would operate only in certain States. It is
difficult enough in a federation to have to deal with State
laws which change from one border to the next. The
balkanisation of Commonwealth laws should not lightly be
accepted. There is a strong argument against the exercise
of the power in relation to anything less than a universal
referral. That does not mean conferring a veto on
idiosyncratic state governments. It requires, however, a
recognition that uniformity is a priority goal where the laws
of the Commonwealth are concerned.
EXECUTIVE COOPERATION IN A
FEDERATION
Cooperation may be affected through the use of the
executive power of the Commonwealth and the States.
Joint authorities may be established to carry out particular
tasks. Such authorities may involve representation of each
of the States and Territories and of the Commonwealth.
They may be subject to the approval of a particular
ministerial council. One example is the National Transport
Commission (NTC) and its predecessor, the National Road
Transport Commission (NRTC). The Commonwealth
Parliament does not have any specific legislative power over
road transport. Such powers lie with the States and
Territories. Before the NRTC was set up in 1991,
coordination of the regulation of road transport was
undertaken through the Australian Transport Advisory
Council. The Ministers for Transport of the
Commonwealth, the States and the Territories made up
that Council. The impetus for the establishment of the
NRTC is described in McIntyre and Moore, The National
Road Transport Commission: An Experiment in Cooperative
Federalism, a paper presented to the Public Law Discussion
Group, Faculty of Law, Australian National University on
July 17, 2001. The authors of the paper observed:
By the early 1990s, there was a widespread perception that
the division of powers under Australia’s federal system was
acting as an impediment to economic efficiency and that this
impediment had to be addressed to enable Australia to
maintain a competitive position in an increasingly difficult
world economic environment. At this time there was a
perception in the road transport industry and amongst
transport policy makers that the efficiency of road transport
was impeded as it was a national industry suffering from
differential regulatory treatment by States and Territories.
Some of the differences pointed out by the authors
included standards for heavy vehicles, including their
weights and dimensions, permitted hours of driving, work
and vehicle charges. The NRTC was established in January
1992, and operated under a Commonwealth Statute, the
National Road Transport Commission Act 1991 (Cth), and
intergovernmental agreements known as the Heavy
Vehicles Agreement and the Light Vehicles Agreement are
attached as schedules to that Act.
In January 2004, under the National Transport Commission
Act 2003 (Cth), the NTC replaced the NRTC. The
establishment of the NTC similarly relied upon a
Commonwealth statute and an inter-governmental
agreement, the Inter-Governmental Agreement for20
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Regulatory and Operational Reform in Road, Rail and
Intermodal Transport, also signed by the Commonwealth,
State and Territory Transport Ministers as members of the
Australian Transport Council. As the titles of the Act and
agreement suggest, the new Commission’s charter is
broader than its predecessor’s; in addition to its regulatory
and reform roles in relation to road transport, the NTC
also undertakes regulatory and reform functions in relation
to rail and intermodal transport.
There are a large number of Acts of Parliament which
allow arrangements to be made between Commonwealth
and State governments to give effect to the statute or to
confer functions or duties on officers of the other
jurisdictions. One area of executive cooperation that has
generated some difficulty is the conferring on
Commonwealth officers of duties under State law. Under
the old Corporations Law of the States, breaches of the law
were to be prosecuted by the Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions. In R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535,
the High Court held that a State Parliament does not have
power to invest functions in Commonwealth officers
directly. However the Commonwealth Parliament can
through its incidental legislative power allow
Commonwealth officers to carry out functions and accept
appointments in addition to their Commonwealth office.
The High Court, however, would have held invalid a
provision of a State law purporting to impose a duty upon
a Commonwealth officer.
JUDICIAL COOPERATION
The area of co-operative federalism in respect of the
judiciary has already been mentioned in the context of
Chapter 3 of the constitution which expressly permits the
Commonwealth Parliament to confer federal jurisdiction
on State courts. There is no equivalent provision allowing
State legislatures to confer jurisdiction on Federal courts to
deal with matters of state law. There is nevertheless still
ample room for cooperation within the judiciary. There
have been instances in which members of one State
Supreme Court have sat as temporary members of another.
In a recent case involving an appeal to the New South
Wales Court of Appeal in which Justice Heydon, formerly
of that Court, was named as a respondent, Chief Justice
Malcolm of the Supreme Court of Western Australia sat
with Justice McPherson of the Queensland Court of Appeal
and Justice Ormiston of the Victorian Court of Appeal to
constitute a special bench of the New South Wales Court
of Appeal. When Justice Ipp of the Western Australian
Supreme Court was seconded to the New South Wales
Court of Appeal for 12 months, judges of that Court visited
Western Australia to sit on appeals in the Supreme Court
of this State.
There have been in the past exchanges between the
Supreme Court of New South Wales and the Supreme
Court of the Northern Territory. In 2005 the Magistrates
Courts in Tasmania and the Northern Territory initiated an
exchange scheme in which a magistrate from Tasmania sat
for six months in the Northern Territory and vice versa.
Judicial exchanges between entities in a federation can
be a useful means of overcoming judicial parochialism
within those entities. It encourages a sense of national
participation by judges who might otherwise be
geographically confined. For these and other reasons I have
recently proposed to the Judicial Conference of Australia
the establishment of a comprehensive judicial exchange
scheme in the Commonwealth (see R French, “Judicial
Exchange – Debalkanising the Courts”, (2006) 15 JJA
142). Canadian Provincial judges have proposed a
comprehensive exchange scheme of their own but it is yet
to be implemented.
The European Parliament and Council have attached
considerable importance to judicial exchange programs as
part of a wider strategy for training judges of the Member
States of the European Union. A pilot project was created
by the European Parliament for 2004 and 2005. Its stated
purposes are:
1. To develop exchanges between members of the
judiciary in order to enhance the level of mutual
confidence and to facilitate mutual recognition of
decisions within the European Union.
2. To increase judicial awareness of EU instruments on
judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters by
development e-learning tools.
3. To develop contacts and networking between national
institutions in charge of training of the judiciary.
The mechanisms for achieving these outcomes are
exchanges of judges based on individualised training
schemes, e-learning facilities to increase knowledge of EU
instruments in criminal and civil matters and meeting
officials responsible for training institutions (see
http//www.europa.eu.int/comm./justice-home/funding/
civil-cooperation/funding-civil-cooperation-eu.html).
The proposed Work Program for 2005 sets out
objectives which have some resonance with the objectives
of an Australian judicial exchange system suggested earlier
in this paper. Judicial exchange is said in the Work Program
to be:
… aimed at enhancing their knowledge of each other’s
judicial procedures and their awareness of belonging to a
common area.
The utmost importance is placed on the development of
“mutual trust between the judicial authorities in the
Member States, who must be closely involved in each stage
of the project.” It is said:
Ultimately these exchanges should lead to an enhancement in
mutual trust between judges as well as judicial authorities, the
setting up of cross-border networks and partners, a greater 21
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understanding of each others’ systems and a greater knowledge
of European Community and/or Union legislation.
The Work Program, which is expressed at a level of
generality no doubt appropriate to its application to a
variety of Member States with much greater diversity in
their judicial and legal systems than exists between the
States of Australia, does not spell out with precision how
judicial exchange involving work in national courts would
operate. It sets out, as an initial requirement, identification
of the statutory framework of exchanges and “the legal
framework for participation by judges and public
prosecutors in the work of national jurisdictions …”
It can be seen from the preceding examples that the idea
of judicial exchange in its various manifestations is not
novel, although it appears to be relatively recent even when
regard is had to the experience of other countries.
The use of judicial exchange, whether by exchange
sittings or the lesser option of inter-jurisdictional
visitation, can be a powerful influence in the development
of a sense of collegiality between judges and courts and at
a national level.
CONCLUSION
It is a striking feature of the Australian Federation today
that despite the frictions which exist between the
Commonwealth and the States from time to time, there is
an increasing incidence of sophisticated intergovernmental
arrangements which, in a co-operative way, enable the
Commonwealth and the States and Territories to address
problems of national concern without the risks of
constitutional challenge or the uncertain necessities of
formal amendments to the constitution. Such consensual
arrangements leave room for the pluralism and diversity
that can be a benefit of federation by providing
opportunities for the cross fertilisation of ideas from one
local setting to another.
Nevertheless, it may be that at some time it will be
thought appropriate to amend the constitution in such a
way as to provide more directly for co-operative
arrangements and particularly for State laws conferring
functions and duties by arrangement with the
Commonwealth, upon Commonwealth officers.
The question whether any of the techniques of co-
operative federalism used in Australia may have application
for the European Union, which is not a federation, is
beyond the scope of this article. It seems at least plausible
however, that co-operative federalism is possible
independent of specific constitutional authorisation. To
that extent its techniques are potentially as applicable in
contemporary Europe as they are in Australia.
ANNEXURE 1
Section 51 – Constitution
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the
Commonwealth with respect to:
(i) Trade and commerce with other countries, and among the
States:
(ii) Taxation; but so as not to discriminate between States or
parts of States:
(iii) Bounties on the production or export of goods, but so that
such bounties shall be uniform throughout the
Commonwealth:
(iv) Borrowing money on the public credit of the
Commonwealth:
(v) Postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and other like services:
(vi) The naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and
of the several States, and the control of the forces to execute
and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth:
(vii) Lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys;
(viii) Astronomical and meteorological observations;
(ix) Quarantine:
(x) Fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits:
(xi) Census and statistics:
(xii) Currency, coinage, and legal tender:
(xiii) Banking, other than State banking; also State banking
extending beyond the limits of the State concerned, the
incorporation of banks, and the issue of paper money:
(xiv) Insurance, other than State insurance; also State insurance
extending beyond the limits of the State concerned:
(xv) Weights and measures:
(xvi) Bills of exchange and promissory notes:
(xvii) Bankruptcy and insolvency:
(xviii) Copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and trade
marks:
(xix) Naturalization and aliens:
(xx) Foreign corporations, and trading or financial corporations
formed within the limits of the Commonwealth:
(xxi) Divorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation thereto,
parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of
infants:
(xxiii) Invalid and old-age pensions:
(xxiiiiA)The provision of maternity allowances, widows’ pensions,
child endowment, unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness
and hospital benefits, medical and dental services (but not
so as to authorize any form of civil conscription), benefits
to students and family allowances:22
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(xxiv) The service and execution throughout the Commonwealth
of the civil and criminal process and the judgments of the
courts of the States:
(xxv) The recognition throughout the Commonwealth of the
laws, the public Acts and records, and the judicial
proceedings of the States:
(xxvi) The people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to
make special laws:
(xxvii) Immigration and emigration:
(xxviii) The influx of criminals:
(xxix) External affairs:
(xxx) The relations of the Commonwealth with the islands of the
Pacific:
(xxxi) The acquisition of property on just terms from any State or
person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament
has power to make laws:
(xxxii) The control of railways with respect to transport for the
naval and military purposes of the Commonwealth:
(xxxiii) The acquisition, with the consent of a State, of any railways
of the State on terms arranged between the Commonwealth
and the State:
(xxxiv) Railway construction and extension in any State with the
consent of that State:
(xxxv) Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and
settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits
of any one State:
(xxxvi) Matters in respect of which this Constitution makes
provision until the Parliament otherwise provides:
(xxxvii) Matters referred to the Parliament of the Commonwealth by
the Parliament or Parliaments of any State or States, but so
that the law shall extend only to States by whose
Parliaments the matter is referred, or which afterwards
adopt the law:
(xxxviii)The exercise within the Commonwealth, at the request or
with the concurrence of the Parliaments of all the States
directly concerned, of any power which can at the
establishment of this Constitution be exercised only by the
Parliament of the United Kingdom or by the Federal
Council of Australasia:
(xxxix) Matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by
this Constitution in the Parliament or in the either House
thereof, or in the Government of the Commonwealth, or in
the Federal Judicature, or in any department or officer of
the Commonwealth.’
ANNEXURE 2
Acts passed by the Parliaments of the States to refer matters to the Parliament under Section 51(xxxvii)
State Number Short title How affected
New South Wales No 65, 1915 Commonwealth Powers (War) Act 1915 Expired 9 Jan 1921; see s 5
No 33, 1942 Commonwealth Powers Act 1942 Expired; see s 4
No 18, 1943 Commonwealth Powers Act 1943 Expired; see s 4
No 48, 1983 Commonwealth Powers (Meat Inspection) Act 1983 (Still in force)
No 182, 1986 Commonwealth Powers (Family Law – Children) Act 1986 (Still in force)
No 61, 1992 Mutual Recognition (New South Wales) Act 1992 (Still in force)
No 104, 1992 Commonwealth Powers (State Banking) Act 1992 (Still in force)
No 100, 1993 Commonwealth Powers (Poultry Processing) Act 1993 (Still in force)
No 1, 2001 Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001 (Still in force)
Victoria No 3108 Commonwealth Powers (Air Navigation) Act 1920 Repealed by No 4502
No 3658 Commonwealth Arrangements Act 1928 (Part III) Repealed by No 4502
No 4009 Debt Conversion Agreement Act 1931 (No 2) (Still in force)
No 4950 Commonwealth Powers Act 1943 Not proclaimed to come
into operation and cannot
now be so proclaimed
No 92, 1986 Commonwealth Powers (Family Law – Children)Act 1986 (Still in force)
No 2, 1993 Mutual Recognition (Victoria) Act 1993 (Still in force)
No 59, 1996 Commonwealth Powers (Industrial Relations) Act 1996 (Still in force)
No 6, 2001 Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001 (Still in force)
24
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Queensland 12 Geo V No 30 The Commonwealth Powers (Air Navigation) Act 1921) Repealed by 1 Geo VI. No 8
22 Geo V No 30 The Commonwealth Legislative Power Act 1931 Repealed by No 46, 1983
7 Geo VI No 19 Commonwealth Powers Act 1943 Expired; see s 4
14 Geo VI No 2 The Commonwealth Powers (Air Transport) Act 1950 (Still in force)
No 37, 1990 Commonwealth Powers (Family Law – Children) Act 1990 (Still in force)
No 67, 1992 Mutual Recognition (Queensland) Act 1992 (Still in force)
No 43, 2001 Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001 (Still in force)
South Australia No 1469, 1921 Commonwealth Powers (Air Navigation) Act 1921 Repealed by No 2352, 1937
No 2061,1931 Commonwealth Legislative Power Act 1931 (Still in force)
No 3, 1943 Commonwealth Powers Act 1943 Expired; see s 5
No 89, 1986 Commonwealth Powers (Family Law) Act 1986 (Still in force)
No 72, 1993 Mutual Recognition (South Australia) Act 1993 (Still in force)
No 21, 2001 Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001 (Still in force)
Western Australia No 4, 1943 Commonwealth Powers Act 1943 Repealed by No 58, 1965
No 57, 1945 Commonwealth Powers Act 1945 Repealed by No 58, 1965
No 30, 1947 Commonwealth Powers Act 1943, Amendment Act 1947 Repealed by No 58, 1965
No 31, 1947 Commonwealth Powers Act 1945, Amendment Act 1947 Repealed by No 58, 1965
No 73, 1947 Commonwealth Powers Act 1945, Amendment Act (No 2)
1947 Repealed by No 58, 1965
No 81, 1947 Commonwealth Powers Act 1945-1947, Amendment
(Continuance) Act 1947 Repealed by No 58, 1965
No 53, 1995 Mutual Recognition (Western Australia) Act 1995 (Still in force)
No 7, 2001 Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001 (Still in force)
Tasmania 11 Geo V No 42 Commonwealth Powers (Air Navigation) Act 1920 Repealed by 1 Geo VI.
No 14
No 46, 1952 Commonwealth Powers (Air Transport) Act 1952 (Still in force)
No 62, 1966 Commonwealth Powers (Trade Practices) Act 1966 Expired; see s 2
No 5, 1987 Commonwealth Powers (Family Law) Act 1987 (Still in force)
No 33, 1993 Mutual Recognition (Tasmania) Act 1993 (Still in force)
No 20, 1994 Commonwealth Powers (Family Law) Amendment Act
1994 (Still in force)
No 39, 2001 Corporations (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2001 (Still in force)
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